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 Evolution of UK Corporate Ownership and Control: Codification, Governance, 
Transition and Context 
By Anna Tilba 
Newcastle University Business School  
Overview 
Understanding 21st century finance in is an urgent task for academics, practitioners 
and policymakers alike. More often than not, the research agendas and debates have been 
established and taken forward by scholars within the silos of their own academic fields. This 
chapter highlights the need to re-appraise some of the terminology and methodology we use 
in relation to charting the evolution of British business and stimulate a more interdisciplinary 
dialogue between business history and other disciplines. The chapter begins with an account 
of the evolution of UK ownership and corporate control starting from the middle of 19th 
century to the present day. The emergence of a new class of institutional investor-owners 
such as pension funds, insurance companies, endowment funds and other asset managers is 
noted, alongside their increasing significance within academic and policy debates.  Turning 
from the historical to the contemporary, the chapter elaborates on the development of 
corporate governance codes, which place more emphasis on greater accountability and 
stewardship both inside and outside the corporate boardroom. Using examples from corporate 
governance research, the chapter proceeds with a selective overview of the mixed evidence of 
institutional investor stewardship, but at the same time a lack of voice and influence over the 
strategic decisions senior managers make. The apparent lack of investor engagement and 
‘control’ undermines the extensive use of labels such as ‘Financial Capitalism’ or ‘The New 
Financial Capitalism’ within the academic literature and popular press. The concluding 
sections of this chapter cautions against an oversimplified use of such terms and call for a 
more contextualised view of ownership where intellectual conversations would attend to both 
historic contexts, as well as theoretical and practical implications.  
Patterns of UK Corporate Ownership and Control  
One of the key questions in the history of the modern public company is when exactly 
did corporate ownership become separate from corporate control? The literature on the 
evolution of corporate ownership is voluminous,1 and is highly influenced by the seminal 
work of Berle and Means (1932) whose view was that US companies were the early movers, 
with ownership being separated from control at some stage in the early twentieth century 
followed by the same transition in other Anglo-Saxon economies in the latter part of the 
                                                          
1 For an overview see J.F. Wilson (1995) British Business History, 1720-1994 (Manchester, 1995). For thorough 
surveys of historical trends influencing the development of Britain’s current system of corporate governance see 
Cheffins B. (2001). ‘Law, Economics and the UK’s System of Corporate Governance:  Lessons from History’, 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 71 and Cheffins, B. (2004). ‘Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of 
Corporate Ownership and Control: The British Experience’, Business History, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp.256-284. For a 
political and historical account of corporate governance see Mar Roe (2004). ‘Institutions of Corporate 
Governance’ in Menard, C and Shirley, M, eds., Handbook for New Institutional Economics’ (Norwell MA: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers).  
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twentieth century (Acheson, et al, 2015). Subsequently, one of the well-established facts 
about corporate ownership is that ownership of large listed companies is dispersed in the UK 
and US and concentrated in most other countries (Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2005). In the 
UK, even in the absence of strong investor protection rights dispersed ownership has emerged 
rapidly in the first half of the 20th century. In a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of 
law, finance and ownership of corporations, Franks, Mayer and Rossi associate dispersion of 
ownership with growth in issued equity, particularly in acquisitions rather than changes to 
regulations. The authors associate regulation with greater market liquidity in controlling 
shareholding blocks. The strengthening of regulation in the second half of the 20th century 
promoted markets in and for corporate control that undermined relations between owners and 
managers, which initially were based on trust, but which in turn made it easier for a market 
for corporate control to emerge. This view is consistent with Cheffins’ (2004) study of British 
evolution of corporate ownership, which considered merger activity to be an important agent 
of change where regulation of anti-competitive conduct is a potentially key determinant of 
corporate ownership structures. Hannah and Kay (1977) also link this to levels of 
concentration in British industry. Indeed, giant firms in the early 20th century simply could 
not have existed in the society of ‘Personal Capitalism’, which had been the norm a century 
earlier. Crucially, economies of scale and scope, widening markets, technological and 
managerial innovations and network effects have driven corporate growth and with it the 
emergence of professional managers and administrators (Foreman-Peck and Hannah, 2012).  
It is important to note that in the latest and first broadly representative study for any 
early twentieth-century economy, Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) break conventional 
wisdom on the separation of ownership from control in the UK by providing evidence of the 
evolution of managerial control being substantially complete before 1914. The authors report 
that in the 337 largest independent UK companies in 1911, the directors routinely had control 
without ownership; management was independent of securities owners and UK investors had 
large overseas portfolio investments. When combined, these factors indicate that the majority 
of the corporate securities owned by UK investors were substantially divorced from 
managerial control, a dispersion which had happened long before Berle and Means (1932) 
quantified it for the US. Most recently, Acheson et. al. (2015) go further and provide an even 
stronger case for support to the argument that diffuse ownership was present in the UK as 
early as the second half of the 19th century. Moreover, ownership was dispersed not only in 
large firms but also in medium-sized and small companies. Their argument that ownership 
diffusion occurred in an era of weak shareholder protection law also undermines the 
influential law and finance assumptions.2 All in all, the dispersion of ownership steadily 
increased over the century and outsiders progressively replaced the insiders as the dominant 
holders of British equities.  
It is also vital to stress that while the UK has for the last 200 years had a robust 
financial services sector, its expansion was particularly striking in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century (Daunton, 1989). Deregulation of financial services and the effective 
                                                          
2 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer ,‘Corproate ownership arund the world’and ‘The economic 
consequences of legal origins’; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer  and Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’.  
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privatisation of personal finance prompted a large flow of funds into pension, insurance and 
property-based financial products (Coggan, 1995). An associated increase in the availability 
of financial intermediation, in the form of lawyers, underwriters, accountants and other 
professionals, has facilitated the processes of corporate restructuring. Inefficient capital 
markets allowed greater tolerance of what Cain and Hopkins (1993) referred to as 
‘gentlemanly capitalists’, which were characterised by reduced accountability to external 
stakeholders. These groups, indeed, stifled the development of capital markets because they 
relied on personal contacts and inherited wealth. 
Overall, the discourse about the evolution of British business is dominated by the 
assumptions that it happened in several distinct periods. For over forty years a majority of 
business historians have relied on Alfred Chandler’s model based on differing patterns of 
ownership and control which were said to develop in stages from personal through to 
entrepreneurial and on to managerial forms of capitalism (Chandler, 1990). This 
categorisation was later on complemented by Lazonick’s three-stage model which 
characterised forms of ownership in terms of proprietal, managerial and collective forms 
(Lazonick, 1991). Lazonick’s thesis, which was more concerned with the nature of decision-
making in different business systems, contrasted with the deterministic nature of Chandler’s 
model. The three stages proposed by Lazonick’s model represented more the descriptions of 
different systems at various points in history, where proprietorial capitalism related to British 
business up to the 1940s; managerial capitalism mostly described American business for the 
most part of the 20th century; and collective capitalism described a Japanese business model 
between the 1940s and 1960s. In other words, Lazonick did not just add another ‘stage’ to the 
Chandler’s model, by adding a collective step, but he was looking at different systems over 
time.  
However, both Chandlerian and Lazoncick’s models have been criticized by business 
historians for a lack of universal appeal. For example, Toms and Wilson (2003) argue that 
Chandler’s model fails to accommodate national cultures and national institutions, as well as 
a constantly changing flow of power. Furthermore, Wilson (1995) observes that both 
Chandler’s and Lazonick’s models fail to link these stages to the overall state of economic 
development. Interestingly, Wilson (1995) argues that different forms of capitalism could be 
operating alongside each other. For example, personal (or proprietorial) firms can be 
operating alongside managerial or collective corporations, that in-spite of a bias towards 
large-scale firms, the existing models offer only a very simplistic insight into the dynamics of 
management structure and decision-making, ignoring the differences between strategic, 
functional and operational management. We will revisit these important arguments later in 
the chapter.  
Notwithstanding a significant amount of criticism3 that Chandler’s and Lazonick’s 
work has had from business historians, there is general agreement among scholars that the 
separation of ownership from control has resulted in a shift to ‘managerial capitalism’ 
                                                          
3 See the work of Steven Toms and John F. Wilson on ‘Revisiting Chandler on the theory of the firm’ and 
‘Scale, Scope and Accountability: Towards a New Paradigm of British Business History’ and John F Wilson’s 
‘Modelling the Evolution of British Business: New and Old Approaches’.  
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(Aguilera, et. al., 2006), which in turn has encouraged ownership diversification to the point 
where most shareholders only held small stakes within companies (Mayer, 2000). The 
changed pattern of share ownership in the UK and US has over the past 30 years led to a 
greater concentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investors such as insurance 
companies and pension funds (Mallin, et. al., 2005). Table 1 demonstrates the changes in UK 
ownership patterns that took place between 1963 and 2010. While analysing the evolution of 
direct ownership structures in the UK for the decade 1991-2001, Marchica and Mura (2005) 
document that whilst outside ownership was relatively stable over time, ranging from about 
22% in 1991 to 32% in 2001, there was a steady decrease in insider ownership. For example, 
executive director ownership has been declining from 14.22% in 1991 to 7.57% in 2001. 
According to Mallin (2008), institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension 
funds, banks, unit and investment trusts and other financial institutions owned approximately 
45% of UK equities, with overseas institutional investors owning 40% and individuals 
owning only 13% of UK equity. This reflects a broader trend where share ownership by 
individuals has been decreasing, from 54% in 1963 to 11.5% in 2010 (ONS).  
Table 1 Percentage of total market value of UK quoted shares by sector of beneficial owner 
1963-2010  
Sector  1963 1975 1981 1991 1997 2001 2010 
Rest of the world 7.0 5.6 3.6 12.8 28.0 35.7 41.2 
Insurance companies  10.0 15.9 20.5 20.8 23.6 20.0 8.6 
Pension funds 6.4 16.8 26.7 31.3 22.1 16.1 5.1 
Individuals 54.0 37.5 28.2 19.9 16.5 14.8 11.5 
Unit trusts  1.3 4.1 3.6 5.7 4.2 1.3 6.7 
Investment trusts … … … 1.5 1.2 1.6 2.1 
Other financial institutions 11.3 10.5 6.8 0.8 1.3 7.2 16.0 
Charities  2.1 2.3 2.2 2.4 1.9 1.0 0.9 
Private non-financial companies 5.1 3.0 5.1 3.3 1.2 1.0 2.3 
Public sector  1.5 3.6 3.0 1.3 0.1 - 3.1 
Banks 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.3 2.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
By 2015, out of £6.6 trillion of assets under management in the UK, approximately £2.1 
trillion were invested through pension funds, £1.2 trillion were in retail investment products 
and £0.4 trillion in public sector and charity investments. There is a further £1 trillion 
investment in insurance products and £1 trillion invested in non-mainstream asset 
management products, which include pension fund investments (FCA, 2015). In 2010, UK 
pension funds invested around 43% of their assets in UK equities, a figure that amounted to 
nearly £400 billion (The Pension Protection Fund, 2010). Considering this significant amount 
of capital under institutional investor’s management, it is unsurprising that both academics 
and policy makers have assigned a greater role to institutional investors within both the 
policy agenda and scholarly debates.  
 
Development of Corporate Governance Codes  
A variety of factors have put corporate governance research and policy under the 
spotlight, including the changing nature of the UK ownership landscape, the dynamics of 
power and influence in and around corporate boardrooms, and an apparent inability of boards 
to oversee and discipline managers, which was becoming evident in persistent spectacular 
and surprising British corporate failures in the final quarter of the twentieth century. A 
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chapter by Steven Toms in this book analyses the history of fraud and financial scandals in 
the United Kingdom, identifying some common features. Corporate collapses of firms such 
as Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) have been investigated in detail, 
demonstrating that this arose because of weak oversight within a complex multinational 
organisation. Other cases - Barings, Blue Arrow, British and Commonwealth/Atlantic 
Computers, Coloroll, Guinness, Lloyd’s of London, Mirror Group/Maxwell, Polly Peck, 
Queen’s Moat House Hotels and Ferranti represented the examples of wider contemporary 
failures in auditing and financial reporting. These failures precipitated efforts to improve 
governance and accountability, which began with the Cadbury Report in 1992 (Billings, et al, 
2015).   
The Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, also known as the 
Cadbury Committee, was set up in May 1991 to address the increasingly voiced concerns 
about the conduct of the UK companies and how they dealt with financial reporting, 
accountability and the wider implications of these issues. The Committee was sponsored by 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the 
accountancy profession. It produced a draft Report in May 1992 and, after further 
consultation, published its final Report and recommendations in December 1992. Central to 
these was the code of best practice in corporate governance (the Cadbury Code) and the 
requirement for companies to comply with it or explain to their shareholders why they had 
not done so.  
The Cadbury Report played a crucial role in influencing thinking about corporate 
governance around the world. The Report had identified ‘corporate governance’ as ‘the 
system by which the companies are directed and controlled. Boards of directors are 
responsible for the governance of their companies’. Notwithstanding the significance of this 
report, however, many critics have argued that it did not go far enough to improve corporate 
governance practices by simply introducing a ‘comply or explain’ culture. Tilba (2015) 
suggests that the narrative around Cadbury was framed mostly in terms of resolving the 
issues arising between shareholders and boards, excluding, for example, the employees. In 
their review of the history of Cadbury Committee Spira and Slinn were also reluctant to 
highlight that the ‘comply or explain’ agenda might indicate that the membership of the 
committee did not seem to be interested in changing anything substantial (Tilba, 2015).  
Perhaps not surprisingly more governance reports that followed4 focused on 
preventing the potential abuse of corporate power and called for greater accountability, 
compliance and independence at board level, the separation of the role of chairman of the 
board from that of chief executive, as well as more effective participation by non-executive 
directors on boards. The Higgs Review, which particularly focused on the roles and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors (2003) has led to the changes to the UK Combined 
Code and served as a basis for new governance regulation in other countries. Since the 
publication of Cadbury in 1992 and the UK Combined Code, corporate governance codes 
have become an important global phenomenon informing how both businesses set policy and 
governments assess the need for regulation (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). In the US, 
for example, Institutional Shareholder Services and Investor Responsibility Research Center 
have emerged, while by 2002 the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act was rushed through following yet 
more corporate scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and Arthur Andersen. The Act 
significantly raised corporate governance requirements for all companies listed in the US.  
However, despite the developments in governance regulation through ‘hard’ laws in 
the US or ‘soft’ law (code-based) in the UK, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has 
                                                          
4 For an overview of the development of UK corporate governance codes see Nordberg and McNulty (2013). 
‘Creating better boards through codification: Possibilities and limitations in UK corporate governance, 1992-
2010’, Business History, 55:3, 348-374.  
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demonstrated that poor conduct and governance failures still persisted. The impact of 
recurring collapses, especially the loss of pensions savings of employees, raised questions on 
the social legitimacy of corporations, prompting further reconsiderations of what constitutes 
good (even, best) corporate governance practices in the UK and around the world. In 2009 
the UK’s FRC commissioned a fresh revision of the Combined Code, which was conducted 
in parallel with a review of corporate governance in UK banks (Walker Review, 2009). The 
outcome of these reviews was the new UK Corporate Governance Code. Nordberg and 
McNulty (2013) observe a shifting discourse in the codification within UK corporate 
governance away from board structures, composition and procedures in Cadbury towards 
‘behaviour’, as the code seeks to improve board effectiveness as a mechanism of governance. 
The revised version of the Code now explicates that compliance is not enough; what is also 
important is the substance of compliance, which is context-specific and involves the 
behaviour of actors both in and around boards.  
The emergence of institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension 
funds, as well as the arrival of non-traditional investors such as hedge funds and investors 
outside the UK (see Table 1), have also altered the character of the codes. Greater attention is 
now being given to the role that institutional investors in the UK and the US ought to perform 
in corporate governance (Mallin, 2008), highlighting the degree of disengagement currently 
pursued by these bodies. Following governance scandals relating to Enron in 2001 and 
leading up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, a number of ‘voluntary’ codes have 
prescribed greater investor monitoring and engagement vis-à-vis investee companies (the 
Myners Review, 2001; HM Treasury Review of Myners Principles, 2004). By 2006, the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance was requiring institutional investors to make 
considered use of their votes; enter into a dialogue with investee companies based on the 
mutual understanding of objectives; and give due consideration to all relevant factors drawn 
to their attention when evaluating corporate governance arrangements of their investee 
companies. Similar requirements have been published by the ISC’s Responsibilities of 
Institutional Shareholders and Agents: Statements of Principles (Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee, 2007). In the UK the financial crisis has served to heighten the expectations of 
policy-makers that institutional investors should act as stewards and engaged owners of 
shares (Ownership Commission, 2012; The Stewardship Code, 2010).  
A year-long review by John Kay of UK equity markets (2012) was especially critical 
of investment short-termism and a lack of investor ownership behaviour. The Kay Review 
emphasized the need for a shift towards long-term and fiduciary standards, necessitating 
loyalty and prudence within the investment world. This also prompted the UK Law 
Commissions’ inquiry into fiduciary duties of investment intermediaries, resulting in a report 
(2014) that defines stewardship activities as including the monitoring of and engaging with 
companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure and corporate 
governance, including culture and remuneration. In November 2015, the Financial Conduct 
Authority launched an Asset Management Market Study in order to to understand whether 
competition within the capital market is working effectively to enable both institutional and 
retail investors to generate value for money when purchasing asset management services. All 
in all, the current landscape of UK ownership, and the legal and regulatory environment of 
shareholder protection, are seen to create receptive conditions for investor involvement in 
corporate governance, while the ‘soft’ codes have placed expectations on institutional 
investors to act not as shareholders but as shareowners. The next section of this chapter 
explores conflicting evidence of investor engagement practices vis-à-vis investee 
corporations.   
 
Corporate Governance, Investor Stewardship and Disengagement  
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Long before corporate governance developed as a research discipline, Berle and 
Means (1932) left an intellectual legacy to the subject of corporate ownership by drawing 
attention to the growing separation of power between the executive management of publicly-
listed corporations and the increasingly diverse and remote shareholders. The separation of 
corporate ownership from control created information asymmetries and the associated agency 
problems, which represent core issues in corporate governance research. Information 
asymmetry in this case means that incumbent managers are in a position to pursue their own 
objectives, such as increasing corporate size, at the expense of shareholders’ interests, for 
example, the value of the company (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Following this agency 
perspective, a principal concern of corporate governance is to employ governance 
mechanisms that resolve or minimize a conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders.  
A significant body of theoretical and empirical literature about corporate governance 
exists on the principal-agent relationships, resulting in the formulation of several hypotheses 
about various governance mechanisms capable of minimizing agency costs. One way of 
differentiating between governance mechanisms is to refer to them as internal (incentives and 
monitoring) governance mechanisms and external (monitoring and disciplinary) mechanisms. 
Internal mechanisms include managerial share ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
oversight by a board of directors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Butler, 
1985), while external mechanisms include managerial labour markets (Fama, 1980), the 
existence of large external shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), mergers, buyouts and 
takeovers (Hirschey, 1986) and the market for corporate control which acts as a mechanism 
of last resort (Jensen, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1987). Fama and Jensen (1983) consider the 
board of directors to be the most central governance mechanism, arguing that managerial 
opportunism can be countered by a board of directors that exercises decision control and 
subsequent oversight of management. 
On the other hand, increasingly institutional investors have been seen by scholars as 
an important governance mechanism associated with monitoring and disciplining 
management (Mallin, 1994; Gillian and Starks, 2000; David, et. al., 2001; Hoskisson, et. al., 
2002; Anabtawi, 2006; Johnson, et. al. 2010). In his seminal work, Hirschman (1970) 
identified the investor-company relationship within the ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ framework, where 
investors either sell shares (‘exit’) if they are dissatisfied, or express concerns to management 
though ‘voice’ or engagement. However, the evidence of investors behaving as stewards in 
the spirit of the codes appears more assumed than demonstrated as managerial decision 
making is still left to professionally trained managers and executives. The empirical evidence 
investigating this relationship is decidedly mixed (Bainbridge, 2003; Dalton, et. al., 2007; 
Tilba, 2011; McNulty, 2015). On the one hand, there is much written about ‘active’ and 
engaging investors, yet on the other hand, the case is made that institutional investors tend to 
be ‘passive’ in their approach to corporations.5 Tilba and McNulty (2013) provide further 
support for this argument when they examine investment practices of UK pension funds, 
finding them to be distant and more concerned with the performance of the portfolios of their 
investment managers, rather than the performance of individual companies in which they 
                                                          
5 For a review of evidence of both investor engagement and disengagement see Tilba (2011), ‘Pension Funds’ 
Investment Practice and Corporate Engagement’ PhD Thesis, University of Liverpool Management School, 126. 
8 
 
hold shares. Although one might expect pension funds to act as long-term and engaged share 
owners because of their supposedly long-term investment horizons (Ryan and Schneider, 
2002), Tilba and McNulty (2013) found that pension funds do not seek to influence their 
investee companies because they operate at a considerable distance from their investee 
corporations with a high dependency on a chain of financial market intermediaries.  
It is also vital to stress, however, that in benchmarking the behaviour of institutional 
investors over this period, one should highlight how since the 1970s it was apparent that in 
spite of their dominance, investment strategies were determined largely by generating short-
term financial rewards, while rarely did they engage much with the management of firms in 
which they invested (Wilson 1995). The change in duration of shareholding and the apparent 
lack of investor involvement with investee companies, despite revisions of investor 
engagement codes, suggests an ‘absentee ownership’ (Daily, Dalton & Rajagopalan, 2003). 
An impression of ‘ownerless’ companies (The Ownership Commission Report, 2012), and of 
the distant and disengaged institutional investor, is puzzling and runs counter to the 
theoretical assumptions and normative prescriptions of the codes of best practice. 
In the context of investor-company relationships, a number of scholars have been 
articulating concerns about the ability and inclination of investors to act as principals and 
monitor and control investee companies. For example, Webb, et. al. (2003) argue that it is not 
the role of the institutional investors to act like banks in developing a long-term relationship 
with investee companies, because institutional investors have different time horizons and 
abilities. Similarly, Hellman (2005) suggests that even large institutional investors cannot 
assume active ownership because these organisations do not have the organisational capacity 
or design to acquire adequate knowledge about specific investee companies, so as to make 
any genuine or worthwhile contribution to discussions on corporate strategy. Furthermore, 
Hendry, et. al. (2006; 2007) find that the traditional conceptualisations of investment fund 
managers as ‘owners’ bears little resemblance to the day-to-day practices of these actors, who 
primarily behave and view themselves as traders. This is evident from the shortening of 
average duration of equity holding periods which have been steadily decreasing from 5 years 
in 1960s to just over 7 months in 2009 (Haldane, 2010). The latest figures of the Ownership 
Commission (2012) indicate that average duration of equity holding in 2012 was just 2 
months. The most recent academic review of the shareholder activism literature by Goranova 
and Ryan (2014) suggests that the research on shareholder activism (both financial and 
social) offers conflicting perspectives. There is evidence of shareholder activism and 
engagement and at the same time there is also a persistent absence of investor influence vis-à-
vis investee corporations. Highly publicized cases of excessive management risk-taking in the 
financial sector and persistent corporate failures further add uncertainty about institutional 
investor ability to act as owners.   
A Transition from ‘Managerial’ to ‘New Financial Capitalism’? 
In tracking British business dynamics over time, one should draw a distinction 
between the work of Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) on the early-20th century business, 
which highlights an early divorce between control and ownership and what Davis (2008) and 
Jackson (2008) characterise in the later 20th and early 21st century as the ear of ‘New 
Financial Capitalism’. The key difference between these periods relates to the nature of the 
management in each period: the early-20th century is characterised by a continued presence 
of former family owners within the firm even though they’ve sold out to investors (Wilson, 
1995); while in the late-20th  and early-21st century, ownership and control is dominated by 
professional managers (Wilson and Thomson, 2006). Acknowledging these distinctions, we 
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move on to see further changes within UK ownership landscape over the course of the last 
fifty years, which is characterised by the dominance of institutional investors such as 
insurance companies and pension funds, which represent enormous pools of money invested 
in the stock market (Cheffins, 2004; Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2005; Marchica and Mura, 
2005; Mallin, et. al., 2005). These changes have been tracked in some detail by Wilson 
(1995) and Wilson and Thomson (2006). For this reason many scholars have argued that 
traditional ‘managerial capitalism’ has been supplanted by the so-called ‘financial 
capitalism’, a regime characterised by active markets for corporate control, flexible labour 
markets, the primacy of shareholder value and dispersed share-ownership (Aguilera, et. al., 
2006; Clark and Hebb, 2004; Dore, et. al, 1999; Useem, 1996). A number of corporate 
governance scholars have also argued that in this new era of capitalism it would be rational 
for institutional investors to act as share ‘owners’ and use their ‘voice’, as opposed to 
‘exiting’ by selling large blocks of shares on the market, which would have a negative impact 
on the performance of the investment portfolio as a whole (Hawley and Williams (2000)). 
Clark and Hebb (2004) have argued that institutional shareholders such as pension funds are 
evolving into a new stage of Anglo-American capitalism characterised by the increased 
significance of the shareholders in corporate governance. They assert that pension funds can 
act with a unified force, demonstrating an ability to reflect a power shift within a firm away 
from managers and towards shareholders and the pension funds which represent them. 
However, it is important to note that paradoxically, while institutional investors seem 
to be growing in size and in the concentration of their stakes, which gives them potential 
influence over corporate managers, their use of equity-holdings generally lacks the 
corresponding or desirable investor engagement with investee corporations. Indeed, it is 
increasingly apparent that there is extensive evidence of both high levels of share liquidity 
and the absence of 'voice' in investor behaviour. Davis (2008) and Jackson (2008) have 
referred to this process as the emergence of 'New Financial Capitalism', highlighting the 
reluctance of institutional investors to engage with those firms in which they have invested. 
More recently, Haldane (2010), Knyght, et al (2011), Nicholson, et al. (2011) and Tilba and 
McNulty (2013) have also noted that despite public concerns and government reaction, 
financial sector behaviour appears largely unchanged and geared towards the short-term. This 
is reflected in the trend towards increased stock turnover and shorter average stock-holding 
periods (Tomorrow’s Owners, 2008; Ownership Commission, 2012). In the US, for example, 
Societé Générale Cross Asset Research (2008) shows that the average period of holding stock 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was just seven months, while in the UK 
institutional investors’ portfolio turnover reached 56% (Jackson, 2008).  
Although a number of scholars have argued that this so-called ‘new era’ of capitalism 
ought to be characterised by institutional investors (particularly pension funds) acting as 
share ‘owners’, the existing evidence of institutional investor distance and investment short-
termism indicates that the reality of business ownership and control is more consistent with 
the prevalence of control by managers rather than institutional owners. This supports Martin, 
et. al’s (2007) conclusion that managers rather than owners determine the destiny of the firm. 
This is also something that Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) have observed happening in 
the first half of the 20th century. Furthermore, the authors also provide evidence of increases 
in personal ownership in a wide range of societies (US, Sweden, Italy, France and ex-
communist countries), suggesting that personal capitalism is alive and well everywhere. This 
brings into question the frequently evoked, but rarely analysed, generalisation that traditional 
managerial capitalism has been supplanted by so-called ‘Financial Capitalism’.  
While labels such as ‘Financial Capitalism’ or ‘The New Financial Capitalism’ have 
been used extensively, it is apparent from existing research that corporate management are 
10 
 
rarely exposed to the full impact of the influence institutional shareholders have over either 
strategic or operational decision-making. Indeed, such is the extent of disengagement in 
corporate decision-making by institutional shareholders one might conclude that, in effect, 
very little had changed in British business over the course of the twentieth century. In the first 
place, it is well known that executives are able to control a company when holding much less 
than fifty per cent of the equity, while as a result of the growing importance of institutional 
investment and the appointment of financial representatives onto the board of most publicly-
floated companies, one might argue that there had been no substantial divorce between 
control and ownership. Zeitlin (1974; 1107) confirms this by noting that with regard to 
American corporations, the alleged separation of ownership and control could well be 
described as a ‘pseudofact’, because all that had happened was a change in controlling 
interest. With specific regard to post-1945 trends in British business, while the long history of 
family boardroom domination might have ended in all but a few of the large businesses 
which dominated the industrial landscape by that time. In effect, institutional investors rarely 
engaged much with management, leaving the latter free to dictate strategy and other aspects 
such as remuneration. This is consistent with Cheffins (2001; 2004), who demonstrates that 
companies both in the US and the UK are run by professional managers and are configured 
on the ‘outsider/arm’s-length’ basis, where publicly traded shares are being traded amongst 
dispersed and passive shareholders. Cheffins (2001) suggests that the arm’s-length approach 
prevails because investors are more concerned with the overall performance of their portfolio 
of shares, rather that with developments affecting any one particular company.  
Based on these important observations one can conclude that when terms like 
‘Financial Capitalism’ or ‘The New Financial Capitalism’ emerge in the literature, but do not 
sufficiently reflect reality, we need to challenge such notions. Specifically, one can conclude 
that managerial capitalism has prevailed in British business since early 20th century 
(Foreman-Peck and Hannah, 2012)  While there has been a transformation in the ownership 
of especially large-scale British firms, management continue to exert control over strategic 
and operational direction, albeit in the context of a financial environment dominated by the 
need to sustain short-term performance indicators, while financial institutions remain 
primarily concerned with short-term investment returns and practices. In spite of frequent 
exhortations to change their orientation, institutional owners choose to disengage from the 
firms in which they invest, preferring instead to focus on financial trading as their principal 
modus operandi. There is an argument to be made here that in order to understand the 
complex nature of relationships between managers and owners in British business in the 
twenty-first century, a radical re-appraisal of terminology and methodology is therefore 
required.  
 
Forces of Transition in Business History: The Importance of Context  
Foreman-Peck and Hannah (2012) caution against generalisations about industrial 
systems and varieties of capitalism which foundered because international differences have 
been casually diagnosed. The authors highlight a need to develop alternative models of 
governance/performance interactions within nations in order to understand the chequered 
evolution of managerial capitalism. Within the corporate governance literature, several 
scholars have also emphasized the lack of attention to context (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Johnson, et. al, 2010; Renders and Garemynck, 2012; Jansson 2013). Ahrens, et al. (2011) 
point out that the financial crisis of 2007-09 was a wake-up call for corporate governance 
research, introducing factors such as the influence of national and institutional environments 
on company behaviour and performance. Most recently, in their review of the field of 
corporate governance research McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) highlight a need for 
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more rigorous and relevant qualitative studies exploring the array of interactions and 
processes involved in corporate governance across different levels of analysis and contexts.  
Johns defines context as ‘situational opportunities and constraints that affect the 
occurrence and meaning of organisational behaviour as well as functional relationships 
between variables’ (2006: 386). Despite the fact that context can have both subtle and 
powerful effects, the impact of context on organisational behaviour has not been sufficiently 
recognised or appreciated by researchers, resulting in a general lack of refined, systematic 
language for expressing context (Johns, 2006). In management research the focus on 
explaining lower rather than higher levels of analysis comes at the expense of overlooking 
industrial macro-cultures. Studying context also means exploring manifestations or facets of 
context as related, rather than independent, and over time (Johns, 2006).  
In order to gain a better understanding of both the nature of  business development 
and the total environment in which that activity occurs, one needs to employ models and 
conceptual frameworks that would encompass the clues about issues such as: the nature of 
decision-making within a firm: the nature of ownership and control in a company; and the 
clues about internal values and external pressures. It seems sensible to re-visit earlier 
arguments made by Toms and Wilson (2003) who emphasized the need for a comparative 
analysis of financial institutions and their relationships to corporate business policy and 
revise older and more static models that ignore the dynamics associated with business 
evolution and accountability relationships within the UK system of corporate governance 
(Toms and Wilson 2003). Toms and Wright  (2002) suggest that the strategy and structure of 
British business is closely linked to the relative effectiveness of governance and 
accountability mechanisms.  
Significantly, Toms and Wilson (2003) have developed a conceptual framework 
(illustrated Figure 1), which might be helpful to this line of inquiry. The framework is based 
on ‘the notion that business is always in transition, strategically and structurally, governed by 
interaction of scale and scope economy exploitation and accountability of external 
stakeholders’. This framework holds potential for further analysis and empirical testing 
because it allows researchers to move beyond the static descriptors like ‘managerial 
capitalism’ or ‘personal capitalism’ which have been used to illustrate either the common 
ownership type or a locus of power within business firms.  
Toms and Wilson (2003) provide several compelling arguments against using the 
typical ‘stages’ approach to the evolution of British business. Firstly, they argued that many 
business historians have applied these stages in a rather atheoretical manner, attempting to 
find suitable adjectives to describe different types of ‘capitalisms’, and in so doing fail to 
make any theoretical contribution, neglecting interesting and causal processes of transition 
from one ‘stage’ to the next. Secondly, they find ‘the Darwinian’ nature of these stages 
limited, as it views businesses being capable of merely adapting to changes in their 
environment. This assumption is problematic because, as history lessons have shown, 
businesses (especially large-scale) have successfully fashioned their own environments.6 
                                                          
6 For example, N. Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control, (Cambridge, MA, 1990); D. Korten, 
When Corporations Rule the World, (London, 1995); G. Monbiot, Captive State: The Corporate Take over of 
Britain, (London, 2000).  
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Thirdly, the static stages omit the significant role played by external arrangements like 
networks and clusters.  
In place of this static analysis, Toms and Wilson propose a more flexible way of 
understanding the evolution of British ownership and control by mapping out the forces of 
transition in business history. More specifically, the framework is based on the incorporation 
of corporate governance and accountability relationships and the analysis of scale and scope 
economies in the internal and external components. The strength of this conceptual 
framework comes primarily from being flexible enough to allow for different firms and 
industries of different types of capitalism to co-exist within the same economy and in the 
same historical period. Crucially, Toms and Wilson (2003) highlight that there does not have 
to be an inevitable progression from inefficient to efficient capital markets, or from low 
accountability to high. In other words, although the framework is capable of accommodating 
the ‘stages’ approach, it does not imply a teleological perspective that everything moves 
towards what we can observe today. In short, this means that different forms of capitalism 
could be operating alongside each other.  
Using this approach offers the possibility of coming to terms with the existing 
complexity of capital markets, and at the same time with contradictory evidence of a lack of 
owner-investor control of managerial decision-making. It is then possible to argue that the 
current elements of ‘financial capitalism’ like shareholder primacy, financialisation of 
business strategy and the power of large financial intermediaries can co-exist alongside 
dispersed share-ownership, and a lack of investor engagement and control of managerial 
decision-making - characteristics mainly associated with ‘managerial capitalism’.  Using 
Toms and Wilson’s historical example of textile mills of Oldham in the 1860-1890 period, it 
is also equally possible to see how the democratic ownership of local mills using the one-
share-one-vote mechanism, alongside extensive financial disclosure that held relatively 
powerless directors to account – a trend that today is associated with ‘financial capitalism’.  
Conclusions  
Over the past twenty-five years, we have witnessed an endless flow of corporate 
scandals accompanied by criticisms of financial markets and indeed the nature of ‘capitalism’ 
itself. While governance codes of best practice have been evolving since Cadbury 1992, there 
is still very little to show for all this activity (Keating, 2015). McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas 
(2013) have also reviewed the field of corporate governance research, observing that after 
over two decades of research, reform and prescription via codes and other forms of 
regulation, problems of corporate governance practice still remain. One of the key problems 
of studying ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Useem, 1996; Whitley, 2000; Morgan and Whitley, 
2012) is its concentration on a small number of variables across different environments and a 
consequent tendency to ignore variations in context and combinations of institutions that lead 
to these variables behaving differently when set in different ensembles. Comparative 
institutional analysis needs to step back and identify the conditions under which different 
levels of outcomes and relationships occur. There is a need to build more dynamic models of 
the relationships between actors and across different sorts of contexts. By emphasizing the 
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fluidity of business evolution and crucial links with corporate governance and transaction-
cost economics, Toms and Wilson’s (2003) theoretical framework sets out a substantial 
agenda for future empirical research.  
What remains empirically unresolved is that on the one hand much of the corporate 
governance debates have neglected historical evidence, while on the other hand few 
historians have incorporated corporate governance theories into their analyses. A way 
forward would be for both disciplines to engage in an intellectual conversation that would 
attend to both historic context as well as theoretical and practical implications. Important 
questions to address would be: what is the nature of current ownership and how is control 
exercised; what are the implications of national and organisational contexts; and ultimately, 
when we conceive capitalism as a system of economic organisation. In particular, future 
research questions should explore which of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (shareowner or 
stakeholder) is less flawed as a means of generating wealth and ensuring that it is distributed 
equitably and effectively. 
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Figure 1: Forces of Transition in Business History 
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